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ELBERT PARR TUTTLE
Alfed C. Aman, Jr. t
Elbert Parr Tuttle was a great man. What makes a person great
may not always be what makes for greatness in ajudge, butJudge Tut-
tle's character was integral to his greatness as ajudge. Throughout his
long and illustrious life, certain qualities were always evident: his cour-
age and independence of mind; his creativity; his commitment to law
and to justice; his compassion, and his impeccable integrity. His de-
meanor-grace and attentiveness are the words that come to mind-
added to his ability to communicate, learn, and persuade. As an advo-
cate and as ajudge, those qualities were perhaps most often reflected
in his responses to the struggles of African Americans in the context
of de jure segregation in the South.
In a very profound sense, these were also qualities that made
Judge Tuttle a great teacher. Justice Holmes once wrote:
[N] early all the education which men can get from others is moral,
not intellectual....
Education, other than self-education, lies mainly in the shaping
of men's interests and aims. If you convince a man that another way
of looking at things is more profound, another form of pleasure
more subtile than that to which he has been accustomed-if you
make him really see it-the very nature of man is such that he will
desire the profounder thought and the subtilerjoy.1
Judge Tuttle had this kind of impact on those with whom he
worked-his colleagues in the law firm, his fellow judges, and, espe-
cially, his law clerks. He made it possible for others to believe in jus-
tice, and he made it impossible for anyone who knew him to be
cynical. He seemed always to be fully present as a person in his profes-
sional life. In a commencement address he delivered to the graduates
of the professional schools at Emory University in 1957, he defined
professionalism in a way that also described how many of us who
watched him work every day saw him: "The professional man is in
essence one who provides service .... In a very real sense his profes-
sional service cannot be separate from his personal being."2
Judge Tuttle was an appellate courtjudge for forty-one years. He
presided as ChiefJudge of the Fifth Circuit from 1961 to 1968, at the
t Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
I Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Use of Law Schools, Oration Before the Harvard
Law School Association, at Cambridge, November 5, 1886, on the 250th Anniversary of
Harvard University, in THE EssENTIAL HoLMEs 224-25 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
2 Elbert P. Tuttle, Heroism in War and Peace 13 EMORY U.Q. 129, 138 (1957).
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peak of the civil rights movement, and wrote over 1400 signed opin-
ions. His long career tapped many sources, including his childhood.
The grandson of a civil war veteran who fought in the Union Army,
Tuttle was born in California in 1897. From 1908 until he left for
college, he lived with his parents and older brother, Malcolm, in the
multiracial society of Hawaii. After excelling as a student at the
Punahou Academy in Honolulu, he and his brother went to the main-
land for their college educations. They chose Cornell University.
Many years later, in a speech to the Cornell Club in Jacksonville, Flor-
ida, Judge Tuttle remembered his earliest days at Cornell in this way:
When I arrived at Cornell in the fall of 1914 from Honolulu,
Hawaii, I am sure I was as green a freshman as ever trod those hills
of Ithaca. Within a day or two of my arrival I, like many another lost
freshman, ended up down at Percy Field where the football team
was having afternoon practice. I was desperately anxious to find a
niche for myself in a university that simply overwhelmed me by its
size and complexity. While watching football practice, I saw this
alert young upperclassman, with straight black hair and ruddy
cheeks, talking to Dr. Sharp, the revered coach of Cornell's football
team, almost as if he were an equal. I was so terribly impressed with
this young man and his brashness at approaching the throne so
nonchalantly that I made inquiries as to who he was. I was promptly
told, "Why, that's Sam Howe, a member of the Board of the Cornell
Daily Sun." I then made a few inquiries about the Sun and, having
decided if that's the way you get to deal as equals with the great men
of the campus then that was for me. I can't begin to say either pri-
vately to Sam or publicly to his friends here how much his tolerating
me as a Sun Board competitor meant to me when I was trying to
achieve a foothold. But in any event, I am glad to take this opportu-
nity publicly to thank him for being much less abrupt and impatient
with my efforts than he had the reputation of being with other put-
terers and beginners.3
Judge Tuttle devoted much of his undergraduate career to work-
ing on the Cornell Daily Sun. He wrote extensively for the newspaper
and even worked with E.B. White, who was a few years behind him.
Tuttle became Editor-in-Chief of the Sun as well as his senior class
president. After graduation, he tried his hand as a journalist in New
York City and Washington, D.C., before returning to Cornell to pur-
sue his law degree in 1920.
Judge Tuttle was married during his law school years. He met his
wife to be, Sara Sutherland, in Jacksonville, Florida on a trip he took
there as an undergraduate with one of his fraternity brothers. As the
Judge put it:
3 Elbert P. Tuttle, Talk for the Cornell Club ofJacksonville, Florida, 14 app.B (n.d.)
(on file with author).
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Within two hours of the time that I had walked down the gangplank
of the Clyde Steamship Company's Steamer from New York, I met a
Jacksonville girl, named Sara Sutherland. She too is here tonight.
Her name is different since she now goes under the name of Mrs.
Elbert Tuttle, but the girl is the same....
The whole truth of the matter is that my entire life was shaped
by the Cornell circumstances that originally brought me to Florida,
since marrying a Florida girl and becoming acquainted with the
south are the circumstances that caused me to decide to move to
the south after graduating from law school in 1923.4
Judge Tuttle was no ordinary law student. He graduated first in
his class, and he was Editor-in-Chief of the Law Review. Housing was a
problem in Ithaca in those days, not only for students, but for faculty
as well. SomehowJudge Tuttle was able to scrape together the financ-
ing needed to build an apartment house. He leased some of those
apartments to his own law professors, and, as one of his classmates,
Arthur Dean, noted many years later, Judge Tuttle's desire not "to
offend a beloved teacher, while sticking up for his rights as a landlord,
somewhat complicated his student and editorial life."5 The "Tuttle
Apartments" still stand on Cayuga Heights Road, a tribute to the
Judge's enterprise, diplomacy, and creative problem solving abilities.
Judge Tuttle chose Atlanta to begin his legal career. He and his
brother-in-law, Bill Sutherland, eventually opened their own firm-
Sutherland and Tuttle-and began the process of building yet again,
this time one of the nation's great law firms. But the Judge always did
more as a lawyer than just tend to business.
As a young lawyer, his passion for justice and his willingness to
use his skills as an advocate for the broader good were well apparent.
In a 1973 speech he gave to the student members of the EmoryJournal
of Public Law, the Judge reminisced about three cases in particular that
he handled on a pro bono basis: Downer v. Dunaway,6 Hemdon v.
Lowry,7 and Johnson v. Zerbst. The Judge first became involved in the
Downer case in his capacity as a member of the National Guard. In the
Judge's words:
May 19, 1931, was just an ordinary day for most people. It was
just an ordinary day for me until about three o'clock in the after-
noon. At that moment my telephone rang, interrupting me from
doing whatever a young lawyer, about eight years in practice, does
in his office at three o'clock in the afternoon. It was an emergency
4 I& at 14 appA.
5 Arthur H. Dean, An Appreciation ofJudge Elbert Parr Tuttle, 53 CoRNELL. L. REv. 1, 2
(1967).
6 53 F. 2d 586 (5th Cir. 1931).
7 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
8 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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call from the Adjutant General of the State of Georgia. I was then a
Major in the Georgia National Guard. General Parker told me that
in a county jail situated upstairs in a sheriff's home next door to the
courthouse in a rural county, approximately 60 miles from Atlanta,
there were two black prisoners, one of whom had been identified by
a young white woman as the perpetrator of an alleged rape the
night before, and that a substantial mob of white men had sur-
rounded the jail and were trying to storm it, intent on lynching the
two prisoners. He said the local machine gun company of the Na-
tional Guard had been called out and that they were on duty, but
that they were powerless to protect the building short of firing their
machine guns, which the mob knew quite well they would not do.
He directed me to load several cases of gas grenades and proceed to
this county courthouse in an effort to stem the tide.9
Judge Tuttle and his friend, Leckie Maddox, successfully diverted a
mob of about 1,500 people, but the trial that followed this scene
hardly accorded with the Judge's sense of justice:
Five days later a special grand jury was called into session,
promptly indicted Downer, and the following day, on May 25th, two
companies of National Guardsmen took Downer to the courthouse
in sight of the scene of the riot of the preceding week, there to
stand trial for his life. Conditions in bright daylight were almost as
riotous as they had been on my last visit to that town. We had to
line soldiers up with fixed bayonets to keep the mob out of the
courtroom; each person permitted to enter was searched for weap-
ons and some were found; and soldiers were stationed around the
courtroom itself to be sure that no violence erupted.
A local lawyer of standing in the community was appointed by
the court. He made no motion for continuance and no motion for
change of venue. Of course, Downer was convicted and he was sen-
tenced to be electrocuted 20 days later. We had to put him in the
middle of a phalanx of soldiers to get him safely to the train and
back to Atlanta to await his execution.
By the next morning my mind was in a turmoil about these
proceedings. The forms ofjustice had been followed. Downer had
been indicted by a grand jury; he had been given counsel to repre-
sent him; he had faced his accuser in open court; his fate had been
submitted to a jury of twelve; and he had been given a sentence
within the provisions of the Georgia statute. The lawyer had filed
no motion for a new trial and the special term of court had ad-
journed, thus blocking any appeal on his behalf to the higher courts
of the state of Georgia. Nevertheless, no lawyer of today would say
that he had had a trial. Therefore, no lawyer would say that his
execution would be after "due process."
9 Elbert P. Tuttle, Reflections on the Law of Habeas Corpus, 22 J. PUB. L. 325, 325-26
(1973).
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Having been asked then by Aflanta's well known black lawyer,
the late Austin T. Walden, later Judge Walden, to help him see if
some relief could be obtained for Downer, I quickly found the lan-
guage of the United States Supreme Court in the tragic case of
Frank v. Mangum, where the Court, although denying relief, said
"[w]e of course agree that if a trial is in fact dominated by a mob, so
that the jury is intimidated and the trial judge yields, and so that
there is an actual interference with the course ofjustice, there is, in
that court, a departure from due process of law in the proper sense
of that term. And if the state, supplying no corrective process, car-
ries into execution a judgment of death or imprisonment based
upon a verdict thus produced by mob domination, the State de-
prives the accused of his life or liberty without due process of law."
Thus began my practical education on the Constitution of the
United States, and my first appreciation of the broad sweep of the
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a new aware-
ness of the interplay of State and Federal jurisdictions and the be-
ginning of understanding of the majesty of a Constitution that
contains the following clause: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it."10
Downer received a new trial, but the outcome was the same. Nev-
ertheless, the Judge continued to fight for Downer:
A number of the soldiers in the courtroom who heard the entire
case tried had grave doubts as to the guilt of the accused. A number
of us... went to the Governor's office seeking a stay of execution
pending a further investigation or a commutation to a life sentence.
This was denied, and Downer went to the electric chair still pro-
testing his innocence. Thus John Downer, just as did Leo Frank,
although not personally protected by it, made his contribution to
the development of Constitutional Law for the protection of many
others unknown to him."
The Judge's own constitutional education continued in the Herndon
case, in which he participated with Whitney North Seymour in repre-
senting Angelo Herndon, an African American communist sentenced
to twenty years on the chain gang for distributing leaflets on the court-
house steps. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed his convic-
tion in 1937, thanks to the Judge's efforts. A year later, in the Judge's
words:
I received a letter from a NewYork lawyer associated with the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union, who, like Whitney Seymour, was also
working with a prominent New York law firm. In this letter, the
lawyer, Victor Rothschild, asked me if I would interest myself in a
case pending in the United States District Court in Atlanta. Thus
10 I& at 327-28 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
11 IM at 328-29.
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commenced my interest in the landmark case of Johnson v. Zerbst. In
his letter, Mr. Rothschild told about the plight of the young Marine,
Johnson, who had been sentenced to three concurrent five year
terms in the Federal penitentiary for the offense of passing counter-
feit $20 bills. He had been picked up with a fellow Marine in
Charleston, South Carolina, when he sought to pay for his drinks
with currency found to be counterfeit. He pleaded not guilty and
was put on trial without being informed by the District Court that
he was entitled to have counsel appointed to aid him in his defense.
As might be expected, he made a shambles of his trial. The jury
convicted him and on a three-count indictment he was sentenced to
five years on each with the sentences to run concurrently. He com-
menced service of his term and then at the Atlanta Penitentiary he
found all kinds of free legal advice from fellow inmates. Someone
told him that he had been deprived of a constitutional right to
counsel at his trial. He fied a petition for habeas corpus which
Judge Underwood thought of sufficient gravity to appoint counsel
to represent him. Upon a showing of the bare facts Judge Under-
wood denied the writ but made the comment: "I am of the opinion
... that petitioners were deprived of their constitutional rights .. .
He thought it was too late. 12
It was not too late, so far as the Judge was concerned. He filed an
appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the writ, and the ACLU said
there were no funds to go to the Supreme Court. That did not stop
Elbert Tuttle:
I was so convinced that the trial without aid of counsel violated
either the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment or the guar-
antee of the right to counsel of the Sixth Amendment that I
couldn't turn it loose. So, after making certain from my client that
he wanted to pursue the matter, I petitioned for certiorari. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and I had the pleasure of arguing
the case before the Court. By a 6-2 opinion the Court held that the
trial of an accused in the Federal Court without aid of counsel, un-
less assistance of counsel was intelligently waived, violated the Sixth
Amendment. New law had been made. It is hard to believe today in
light of the tremendous increase in the protections that have been
thrown about Federal criminal trials and post trial procedures that
as recently as 1938 such a case had to be decided in the Supreme
Court.
1 3
These cases are exemplary of the courage, legal imagination, and
passion for justice Elbert Tuttle displayed as a young lawyer. His own
career and convictions made his speech in 1956, to an ABA committee
on the topic of Legal Aid and Equal Justice, even more compelling.
He focused on a problem that remains with us today-the problem of
12 Id. at 331 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
13 Id. at 332 (footnote omitted).
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assuring equal access to justice, not only as an issue of resources, but
also as involving the public's understanding of advocacy and the rule
of law. Judge Tuttle spoke from firsthand experience of the risks of
representing unpopular clients. At the end of the McCarthy era, he
reflected on the necessity of fair representation:
No one, unless he has been counsel in an unpopular cause or a
cause which arouses the passions of the populace, can fully appreci-
ate how trying it is to serve in such capacity, even though the offense
is one which by its very nature excludes the possibility that the law-
yer shares the guilt. How much more burdensome must it be, then,
for a conscientious lawyer to fight to vindicate the rights of a client
who is charged with an offense against laws whose violation brings
down unanimous public contempt and where the secret intent or
beliefs of sympathizers condemn them just as completely in the eyes
of the public as the accused. In such a case it is so easy for the
public to suspect that no one who does not secretly share such se-
cret intent or belief would "stand in the way" of the quick and se-
vere punishment of the accused. The representation of a client in
such a case is such a burdensome matter that none but the hardiest
care to undertake it at best. None at all will dare assume this devas-
tating risk if we permit the feeling to prevail that the lawyer is to be
identified with his client.
It devolves on all of us lawyers constantly to remain alert to
such dangers to the administration of justice, because the right of
the accused to his presumption of innocence, the right to legal rep-
resentation, the right to trial by legal standards, or, as we know it, by
due process, are all things that are of the very breath and being of
the lawyer. Our duty as lawyers to retain this awareness is much
greater because such rights are known dimly, if at all, by the layman
who is aroused in a popular cause.
Most of us who are not crusaders by nature, and especially if we
do not ordinarily become involved in criminal proceedings, are too
apt to become complacent about injustices that are not in some way
brought home to us. This creates a serious danger to the adminis-
tration of justice because too often the person who is directly af-
fected, be he lawyer or accused, is too small a figure in our complex
society for his voice ever to be heard. It is only by the constant
vigilance of the leaders of the organized bar that such injustices can
be effectively spotted and prevented. This is not the time for com-
placency. Chief Justice Warren draws upon a classical statement
.... He related the fact that when Solon was asked how justice
could be secured in Athens, he replied: "If those who are not in-
jured feel as indignant as those who are."
We, as lawyers, cannot leave to the accused who fails to get de-
cent representation, or to the lawyer who, having furnished it, is
1996]
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punished by being identified with his unpopular client, the fight
against such injustice. We must all feel outraged, because this is an
injustice which, if permitted to continue, will threaten the temple
itself.14
Leaving his firm, first to become General Counsel for the Depart-
ment of Treasury in 1952 and then, in 1954, for a seat on the Fifth
Circuit, was not easy. He loved practice and was sad to leave the firm
he helped create and build. At the same time, a new challenge
awaited. He looked forward to it, but he could hardly have antici-
pated just how challenging and important it would be.
Judge Tuttle joined the Fifth Circuit in 1954. Brown v. Board of
Education'5 had just been decided, but no one could foresee its true
significance. Indeed, as some of his early law clerks have noted,16 life
in his office in those early days was focused on traditional law cases
and the hard work of judging. Most of the early cases were not path-
breaking, but some were memorable-in a variety of ways. One law
clerk recounts a case involving some very complicated oil and gas is-
sues and a rather long-winded appellate lawyer. At one point in the
argument, the lawyer had the bad judgment of asking, "Are you with
me, Judge?" Tuttle replied, "No. I've been where you are going for
the last half hour!"' 7 In oral argument, the Judge was always ex-
tremely well prepared, and time after time, asked the key questions.
That remained a constant characteristic of his judicial style for the
forty-one years he served as a judge.
As the civil rights movement picked up steam, it was clear that the
courts, and especially the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, would play a
crucial role. Judge Tuttle became Chief Judge in 1961 and served in
14 Elbert P. Tuttle, Legal Aid and Equal Justice, Speech to Standing Committee on
Legal Aid Work and the Standing Committee of Lawyer Referral Service of the American
Bar Association (Aug. 27, 1956) at 11-17.
15 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16 See Letter from C.V. Stelzenmuller, Judge Tuttle's first law clerk from 1954 to 1955,
to Alfred C. Aman, Jr. (July 24, 1985) (on file with author). Stelzenmuller recounts:
We both worked pretty hard until the end ofJune, 1955, when I left
him for my present law firm. If you don't believe it, look at the printout of
opinions written by Judge Tuttle that ten-month period. The printout
shows 49 Fifth Circuit opinions and one District Court opinion written by
him in that period, a total of 50. I think there were a few Per Curiam's he
wrote also which did not bear his name, and at least two which were work in
progress when I left, not actually decided until July.
Id. at 3. See also Letter from Philip L. Evans, law clerk to Judge Tuttle from 1957-1958, to
Alfred C. Aman, Jr. (Oct. 3, 1985) (on file with author). Evans recounts:
Although I have the fondest personal recollection of my tenure with
Judge Tuttle for the six months I spent as his clerk in 1957 and 1958, the
work of the court at that time had not become as intensely involved with
the civil rights issues as it did later on ....
Id.
17 Letter from James C. Conner, law clerk to Judge Tuttle from 1958 to 1959, to Al-
fred C. Aman, Jr. 3 (Aug. 27, 1985) (on file with author).
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that capacity until 1968. Some of the most important and controver-
sial civil rights cases in this century came to his court. Judge Tuttle's
profound understanding of these issues and the challenge they posed
to society was reflected in his 1966 James Madison Lecture at New
York University. In that lecture, he spoke primarily about the Fif-
teenth Amendment and the importance of assuring African Ameri-
cans the right to vote:
Notwithstanding the truth of Mr. Justice Goldberg's statement
in his lecture here two years ago, "that equality and liberty were the
'twin themes' of the American Revolution," it is clear that, under
the various colonial and early state constitutions, not even all free
men were "equal" when it came to the right to vote.
It is perhaps one of the interesting inconsistencies of the polit-
ical philosophy ofJames Madison that he believed the very variety of
the interests of the mass of the people in any popular government
would constitute a curb preventing the ascendancy of any one par-
ticular interest, or group, and yet he could, with some degree of
complacency, accept a government whose legislators were elected
solely by the representatives of a single well-defined class having a
definite special interest, the ownership of property.
It was not until the Emancipation Proclamation created a new,
easily identifiable class of citizens, having in common with each
other the distinguishing characteristics of race, color, poverty, illit-
eracy, and lack of attachment to the land, that it became apparent
that neither a commonality of interests nor the multiplicity of inter-
ests among citizens would be adequate to protect the peculiar inter-
ests of the new class. It must be borne in mind that, politically, the
Negro population of the Southern states did not exist prior to the
adoption of the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution.' 8
The Judge's understanding of the history of the South, as well as
the meaning of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution enabled him to see that the struggle that
African Americans were engaged in was nothing less than the attain-
ment of their full rights as national citizens. Judge Tuttle's view of
Brown was, thus, a broad one.
Judge Tuttle's reading of Brown and the Civil War Amendments
to the Constitution enabled him and the court he led to marshall the
forces of change in the South to dismantle the de jure system of
apartheid that then existed. In so doing, he was unfailingly coura-
geous and fair. His decisions and those of the court he led have had a
18 Elbert P. Tuttle, Equality and the Vote, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 247-48 (1966) (foot-
note omitted).
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lasting impact on the fabric of the law' 9 and on the lives of the individ-
uals they affected. The Judge did not, however, always prevail, and, in
many instances, his dissents clearly showed his courage and commit-
ment tojustice. Indeed, some ofJudge Tuttle's dissents ultimately be-
came law. In Wesbetry v. Vandiver,20 for example, Judge Tuttle
dissented from a three-judge court decision holding that Georgia's
county-unit system could not be challenged because the issues in-
volved constituted a political question. In Judge Tuttle's view, how-
ever, the issues clearly were justiciable, and the county-unit system was
unconstitutional. 21 Writing for the majority of the United States
Supreme Court, Justice Black reversed the lower court's decision on
appeal, stating: "We agree with Judge Tuttle that in debasing the
weight of appellants' votes the State has abridged the right to vote for
members of Congress guaranteed them by the United States Constitu-
tion ... "22 The Supreme Court also adopted Judge Tuttle's dissent-
ing views in the Bond case, where another three-judge court of which
he was a part ruled that it was constitutional for the Georgia legisla-
ture to refuse to seat duly elected state representative Julian Bond be-
cause of his outspoken views on the Vietnam War.23
Even in cases in which Judge Tuttle ultimately did not prevail, his
words and his philosophy were compelling. In United States v. Bar-
nett,24 for example, Judge Tuttle, in dissent, would have required that
Ross Barnett, Governor of Mississippi and Paul Johnson, the Lieuten-
ant Governor, be tried for criminal contempt of court because of their
attempts to preventJames Meredith from enrolling as a student at the
University of Mississippi. They had been charged with willfully violat-
ing the explicit terms of a temporary restraining order issued by the
Fifth Circuit. Judge Tuttle stated his views in his characteristically
clear and succinct prose:
The gravity of the charges was enhanced, not lessened, by the fact
that they were against a governor and lieutenant governor of a state.
I agree that the Court now has full power to continue the pros-
ecution or to dismiss it without more. I fully respect the judgment
of those who believe the public interest, including the integrity of
the judicial system, calls now for a dismissal. I do not share that
judgment. As I believed then, I believe now, that the public interest
19 See, e.g., Jerome I. Chapman, Expediting Equitable Relief in the Courts of Appeals, 53
CORNELL L. REv. 12 (1967) (discussing "the development of techniques for expediting
effective appellate relief in exigent circumstances").
20 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962), rev'd sub nom. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964).
21 Id. at 286-87 (Tuttle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 4 (1964).
23 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), revg, 251 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ga.).
24 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965).
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requires that a trial be held and that the guilt or innocence of these
two respondents be determined.2 5
In Novak v. Beto,2 6 the Fifth Circuit dealt with a prisoner petition
claiming a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of
the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged, and the record
showed, that in the Texas prison system, prisoners were regularly sub-
jected to conditions in solitary confinement that included a bread-
and-water diet (two slices of bread and some water and one "full meal"
every seventy-two hours), complete sensory deprivation, scanty cloth-
ing, and no bedding. Upon release the inmate's head was shaved
bald. Prisoners were often kept in these conditions for substantial
lengths of time. The record showed that one inmate was kept in these
conditions for seven consecutive weeks. The majority of the court
held the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was not violated. The
Judge wrote:
I am quite reluctant to disagree with my brothers of the majority on
an issue which, I think, necessarily, involves the application of a
moral code to one of society's most difficult problems. However,
there is no indication that the majority and I differ as to our con-
cept of what the moral code should be. The-difference lies in our
concept of the extent to which judges can "risk" permitting their
"own personal moral codes" in such an area as this to be "impose [d]
... on a perhaps unready society." For myself, I do not hesitate to
assert the proposition that the only way the law has progressed from
the days of the rack, the screw and the wheel is the development of
moral concepts, or, as stated by the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dul-
les, the application of "evolving standards of decency."
As to the limiting effect of the "extant law,".., we must remem-
ber that in each of the cases referred to in the opinion in which
cruel and unusual punishment was found to exist, some court had to
take at least a short step beyond what had previously been decided.
This, in fact, is the genius of the common law. I think it is the duty
of the court whose members are "deeply troubled" by these condi-
tions to seek a means of removing them that may offer more prom-
ise than merely saying that "prison reform is primarily a task for
legislators and administrators."2 7
Judge Tuttle's greatness as a person touched nearly everyone who
knew him.. Those of us who were his law clerks imagined this was
especially true of us; certainly, he touched us in ways that shaped our
own lives and careers in profound ways. It was my privilege to.work
25 346 F.2d at 102 (Tuttle, CJ., dissenting).
26 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971).
27 Id. at 672 (TuttleJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in origi-
nal) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
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for the judge from 1970 to 1972. Not only did I learn daily from wit-
nessing the way he lived the law, but all of his clerks and I felt a part of
a very special family. The Judge and Mrs. Tuttle welcomed us to their
home and made us feel like family. When one was in their home, one
saw the same great man as on the bench and in his office. No one
who worked with the Judge could fail to witness and appreciate the
love that existed between the Judge and Mrs. Tuttle. Their relation-
ship was an inspiration to all who knew them, and they generously
shared their love with all of the clerks.
In 1985, in preparation for an oral history project undertaken by
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Historical Society28 (the Fifth
Circuit was split into the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits in 1981), I
was asked by the Historical Society to write each of the Judge's clerks a
letter asking them to recount their impressions of the Court, Judge
Tuttle, and some of the cases they worked on while they were clerks.
These letters provided background for the person who interviewed
the Judge as part of this project, but they also provide a variety of
perspectives on Judge and Mrs. Tuttle. In what follows, I draw on just
a few of these portraits. Paul Szasz, who clerked forJudge Tuttle from
1956 to 1957, noted his great appreciation:
[O]f Judge Tuttle's wide legal knowledge, his common sense, his
kindness and his consequent constant search for fairness andjustice
and the means to achieve these within the four corners of the appli-
cable law, his clear style and his prodigious working habits, out-
standing even on a hard-working court. Then as in later years he
really traveled the Circuit, driving every few weeks with Mrs. Tuttle
to sit in another city. However, perhaps my experience with him
was special in that I didn't own a car or particularly care to travel on
my own, and so I was a constant back-seat passenger and beneficiary
of the Judge's conversations-ranging from matters of law to local
history and geography, to personal anecdotes and sometimes pure
but never malicious gossip-and of his wife's readings. There is no
doubt that he is the most distinguished human being who ever
touched my life.29
Other "small" incidents over the years also speak volumes when it
comes to the Judge's character and the way he dealt with people. Kit
Bond, now a U.S. Senator from Missouri, who clerked for the Judge
from 1968 to 1964, wrote:
In another instance his gentle temper and kindness came to
the forefront. At that time his drafts were being transcribed by a
stenographer in New Orleans. He mailed several tapes or tapes with
28 Letter from Thomas H. Reese, Executive Director of the Eleventh Circuit Historical
Society, Inc., to Professor Alfred Aman (June 12, 1985) (on file with author).
29 Letter from Paul C. Szasz, Director, General Legal Division, Office of Legal Affairs,
United Nations, to Professor Alfred C. Aman, Jr. 2 (July 25, 1985) (on file with author).
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lengthy opinions on them to the New Orleans clerk's office. By
some terrible mistake, the stenographer erased the tapes on which
he had dictated the opinions. When Judge Tuttle was informed of
the error, he laughed... and began again to redictate the opinions.
The stenographer and the rest of us in the office were terribly dis-
tressed for him because of the added workload, but he assured all
the people involved in the error that it caused him no major prob-
lem. His kind words made all of us feel much more at ease.3 0
Anne Emanuel who clerked for the Judge from 1975 to 1976
relates:
As always, he was careful not to use the federal long distance
lines for personal use, and I remember one occasion when he was
upset because another judge called him at the office to arrange a
weekend social visit-and Judge Tuttle was sure the call was at fed-
eral expense. Also, he himself pasted all the Turn Off the Light
When Not in Use stickers up-on each switch-during the energy
crisis.
One more anecdote. On one occasion I traveled to Jackson-
ville with theJudge. It happened that the otherJudges who traveled
there for the sitting had also brought clerks who happened to be
white females, and one had brought his secretary, also a white fe-
male. Clarence (... a youngish black man in the clerk's office in
New Orleans) was there for the clerk's office. One night the clerks,
the secretary, and Clarence all went out to dinner. Several of us
were on the same floor of the hotel as the Tuttles and as it hap-
pened, when we arrived back at the hotel and got off the elevator,
the Judge was out in the hall .... The next morning, we met in the
office and prepared for his day on the bench. He asked me if we
had gone out to dinner with Clarence. I said yes, and that we had
gone out to a nice restaurant atJacksonville Beach, and had a nice
time, etc. TheJudge looked at me with tears glistening in his eyes-
quite moved-and he said: "You will have to forgive me. But when I
first started coming down here it would have been impossible for
you to go out to dinner together-certainly to the particular restau-
rant you went to. And it really does mean a great deal to me."3 1
Stephen Ellman, who clerked forJudge Tuttle from 1976 to 1977,
reflects on how generous the Judge was when it came to the mentor-
ing role he performed for his clerks, as well as how the Judge never
stopped learning or growing himself:
I felt, in fact, that the Judge was really not at all dependent on
his clerks. He took pleasure in talking with us, and he relied on us
readily, but if we fell short he calmly took up the slack. I had the
30 Letter from Christopher S. Bond to Professor Alfred C. Aman,Jr. 2 (July 31, 1985)
(on file with author).
31 Letter from Anne Emanuel to Professor Alfred C. Aman, Jr. 3 (July 25, 1985) (on
file with author).
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feeling that if we'd done nothing at all he would just as calmly have
taken up even more slack. One result was that working for the
Judge was a great pleasure-while I wanted very, very much to
please him, he was free to indulge my youth. It was also an inspira-
don and an education, for I felt that working with him (and getting
to know him and Mrs. Tuttle) revealed to me more about the ele-
ments ofjudging than perhaps anything I'd read in law school. The
Judge's combination of ironic amusement and courageous convic-
tion seemed remarkable to me then, and still does; and Mrs. Tut-
tle's role in his life of course was and is profound.
Part of his strength was also his ability to learn. He came to the
court with a deep commitment to racial equality, and so he hardly
needed to be taught a commitment to the Constitution, but he once
said that the judges of the Fifth Circuit had been given an education
on the Constitution (perhaps he said they'd gone to school on the
Constitution) through the race cases, and so had come to read not
only the Equal Protection Clause but also other sections of the Con-
stitution carefully and seriously. This was no small feat, and surely it
is unusual that a man grows less conservative as he grows older-yet
that seems to be what Judge Tuttle has done.
I can't close without mentioning the Judge's encouragement to
his clerks as they set out in the world. His clerks have gone in many
different directions, and I think he has rejoiced in each, but without
ever pushing me he did help me to follow my heart into public in-
terest law, a decision that proved to be absolutely the right one but
which seemed far from a sure thing to me at the time. But from a
judge growing younger all the time, this support is something one
can count on.
3 2
These reflections are all remarkably consistent when it comes to
the qualities that made the Judge a great man and a greatjudge. We
all miss Judge Tuttle very much. Yet, all that he built, all that he cre-
ated is still here. His integrity and his ability to make us believe in
justice also are a part of his legacy.
Judge Tuttle's greatness was derived from his private, everyday
approach to life and people and his enormous capacity to love. He
was always himself, always the same person, at home, on the bench
and with his friends, family, and colleagues. His character defined his
views of what a professional was and this, in turn, gave him the cour-
age, vision, and legal creativity to be a greatjudge. Judge Tuttle lived,
every day, the principles and convictions that inspired his legal imagi-
nation and transformed a nation.
32 Letter from Stephen J. Ellman, Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School,
to Professor Alfred C. Aman, Jr. 2-3 (Nov. 8, 1985) (on file with author).
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